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Global competition is a particularly topical subjectbecause, as my Penn State colleague ProfessorLarry Backer has written, in today’s globalized
society, no state and few firms can conduct their affairs
without reference to the legal norms of other states. For
consumers and corporations alike, much modern trade is
conducted with little regard for national borders. The ease
of communication, commerce and travel that facilitates
international business, however, also increases the risk that
anticompetitive behavior will cause harm to consumers and
competition in more than one jurisdiction. Thus, modern
competition lawyers must counsel their clients in an
environment where business is conducted across borders
and restraints of trade cause harm internationally and
national competition laws can be enforced extraterritorially.
Whilst purely domestic commercial activity is plausible,
its effect on the global market is arguably virtually de
minimis. Since commercial activity in one jurisdiction likely
affects other states, legal actors and systems must
communicate effectively with each other when adopting
and enforcing laws that have multi-national impact.
Importantly, legislators and law enforcement officials are
already cooperating and competition law is undergoing a
process of consolidation and harmonization. This ongoing
communication, I will argue, goes far towards alleviating
problems of multiplicitous enforcement and establishing
safeguards that further the benefits of global competition.
On one level, the issues raised by global competition
enforcement are purely instrumental: a function of
ascertaining whether are there differences in substance or
procedure that matter, identifying these areas of divergence,
evaluating their significance, and deciding whether and
how they should they be resolved and by whom. On a non-
utilitarian, non-pragmatic level, it is also important to identify
the theoretical bases for any divergences among competition
laws and enforcement regimes and to inquire whether such
laws and enforcement priorities should be harmonized, and
evaluate the justifications for harmonization.
I write from a uniquely American perspective that includes
an appreciation of the federalist model of competition law
enforcement that is the norm. In the United States, two
federal agencies, the US Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, plus the Attorneys General of the
50 states are empowered to enforce the federal competition
laws, the Sherman and Clayton Acts. While the federal
government has exclusive authority to prosecute criminal
actions under federal law, the states are explicitly
empowered by the Sherman Act to represent the natural
person citizens of their states as parens patriae and to seek
equitable relief and civil damages on their own behalf
under federal competition law. In addition, nearly every
state has its own state competition law, also enforced by the
state competition agency (typically a division of the office of
the state Attorney General’s Office) with civil and, in most
states, criminal penalties. State law is ordinarily interpreted
in conformity with federal competition law but there may
be substantive and procedural differences in some states.
Finally, private parties injured by anticompetitive activity
may bring private civil actions under federal and most state
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laws to recover damages and injunctive relief. Parallel
investigation and litigation by a federal agency and one or
more state agencies plus private parties are not infrequent.
These multiple governmental agencies frequently
cooperate in investigations, share information, and may
prosecute cases jointly, but there is no legal requirement
that they do so and, from time to time, they have disagreed
on the competitive effect of a particular activity, leading to
different legal analyses and inconsistent legal actions. Thus,
one agency may seek to prohibit conduct that another
concludes is not anticompetitive, and the US Supreme
Court has explicitly held that states are not pre-empted
from bringing these competition cases.
I would argue that there is real value, but also a real cost,
in the existence of multiple enforcement agencies because,
if one agency fails to take action, another may do so. The
reasons for acting, or failing to act, are diverse and reflect
the value and costs of multiple enforcers. First, an agency
may act, challenging a practice or refusing to challenge it,
for reasons that have nothing to do with competition, for
example, to protect national firms or local employees
rather than competition. Second, the goals of the
competition law on one jurisdiction may be inconsistent
with the norms underlying the law of another jurisdiction,
for example, one law may be based on economic efficiency
goals and another may seek to further social and political
goals. Third, competition enforcement agencies,
representing their sovereign interests, are entitled, indeed
mandated, to pursue their own interpretation of the
public interest. Finally, competition law has evolved as
economic learning develops and there may be a range of
correct answers to many issues of competition law
interpretation.
PROBLEMS OF MONOPOLY AND
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
The problems of monopoly and restraints of trade are
ancient issues. In England, the earliest reported case on
restrictive covenants, which are effectively agreements not
to compete, Dyer’s case, was decided in 1414. The most
famous common law case for American students of
competition law, Mitchell v Reynolds, was decided in 1711,
and the Statute of Monopolies, dating to 1844, is nearly as
ancient. The common law reasoning of these and other
early cases influenced the development of United States
antitrust law, including the 1899 Addyston Pipe case written
by then Judge William Howard Taft in his role as a judge
on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Taft’s
reasoning, distinguishing ancillary restraints of trade from
direct restraints, has found its way into the modern
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court so, in
one sense, “globalization” and harmonization have been a
feature of competition law for generations. The increasing
number of state competition laws and transnational
conduct of business, however, makes the issue one of more
than merely historical interest.
Today, at least 90 states, including both first world and
developing countries, have enacted competition laws and
many of them have active enforcement regimes. As this
journal’s readership is well aware, accession to the
European Union requires applicants to meet various
criteria including adoption of a competition law that is not
inconsistent with the EU competition laws, currently
found in Articles 81 and 82 (formerly Arts 85 and 86). A
draft competition law is currently under consideration by
the People’s Republic of China. In addition to this vast
array of state competition enforcement agencies, there are
many international bodies with an interest and expertise in
competition law matters, including the World Trade
Organization, the OECD, and the International
Competition Network (ICN). More than half of the WTO
member countries have adopted some version of a
competition or anti-monopoly law and the WTO members
have established a working group on competition laws and
enforcement.
Although a vast number of nations have enacted
competition laws, most were adopted recently, within the
past several decades. Japan and Germany, for example,
lacked competition laws until the post-World War II era.
European Union competition laws date from the founding
of the union, then the European Economic Community,
with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The United States
antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act adopted in 1890,
have the longest history of sustained government
enforcement and the most thorough doctrinal and
theoretical development through common law case law.
The list of jurisdictions that have adopted modern
competition laws includes nations from Albania to Zambia,
including all the EU member states, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, South Africa, Thailand,
Turkey, and Venezuela, among numerous others.
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN NATIONAL
COMPETITION LAWS
Although there are some substantive and procedural
differences among the existing competition statutes, most
have important features in common. Most national
competition laws broadly prohibit horizontal cartels, such
as agreements among competitors to fix prices, rig bids or
allocate markets. Most also condemn certain vertical
agreements between firms at different levels of the chain of
distribution, particularly those agreements that fix resale
prices or require purchasers to buy one product in order to
purchase another, so-called “tying arrangements,” or
otherwise unreasonably restrain competition. Most
jurisdictions prohibit single firms from amassing too large
a share of a market and abusing their market power, in
provisions variously termed “abuse of a dominant
position” or “anti-monopolization” laws. Finally, nearly
half of all jurisdictions have adopted laws regulating
mergers and requiring merging firms to notify the18
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enforcement agency, provide information, and receive
approval before consummating the merger.
Although substantive prohibitions are therefore largely
congruent, there are important procedural differences,
making counselling and compliance difficult and costly.
These inconsistencies are particularly troubling in the area
of merger review, in which firms may be required to seek
approval in every jurisdiction in which they do business
and the timetables for review and particular information
required to be produced may vary. Another important area
of divergence is in the level of expertise and commitment
to enforcement by government competition agencies.
In the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair Trading is the
lead competition enforcement agency. The OFT Board was
created on 1 April, 2003, and is currently chaired by John
Vickers and includes an executive director and five other
members. Charged with enforcing the Competition Act,
the OFT articulates its mission as halting cartels and other
anti-competitive arrangements, investigating and
challenging firms found to be abusing a dominant market
position, and cooperating with the European Commission
Competition Directorate and other international
competition authorities. The Competition Commission, a
separate independent body, is charged with investigating
monopolies, mergers and economic regulation of utilities
referred by UK competition authorities. This body was
established by the Competition Act of 1998, superseding
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Chaired by Sir
Derek Morris and two deputy chairs, the 40-member
council members are appointed by the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry. The Commission comprises a
“Reporting Side” to investigate monopolies, mergers and
other matters referred to it and an “Appeals Tribunals” to
consider appeals of decisions made by the Office of Fair
Trading and other economic regulatory authorities.
SHOULD A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION LAW BE CREATED?
The multiplicity of competition laws and the potential
for conflicts may increase the costs of doing business for
firms competing internationally without a corresponding
benefit for consumers. These costs include the time and
expense of ascertaining the competition laws to which they
are subject, frequent training programs to educate their
employees in the field to comply with the legal
requirements, and the legal expenses of compliance with
the substantive provisions. Indeed, firms may fear that they
may be faced contradictory substantive or procedural
requirements of some statutes and therefore decline to
enter particular markets in states with new or unfamiliar
competition laws. These costs hamper firms in pursuing
their legitimate business objectives and deny consumers
the economic benefits of their presence in the market.
Therefore, in consideration of the economic costs of
multiple competition laws and enforcement regimes, one
might reasonably inquire whether 90 distinct competition
laws are necessary to protect consumers from anti-
competitive conspiracies.
Uniformity could be obtained by adoption of a supra-
national competition law enforced by a supra-national
agency such as the WTO. Alternatively, a single, uniform
competition law could be adopted superseding the 90
individual national statutes currently on the books.
However, before advocating uniformity in either form,
specific differences between individual competition laws
and their justifications must be examined.
A fundamental objection to a uniform international
competition law is that the states which have adopted these
laws differ fundamentally. The American Bar Association
Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and
Practice, in a January 2000 Report on the
Internationalization of Competition Law Rules, describes
seven distinct national models among the states that have
adopted competition laws. The national model inevitably
influences the particular substantive provisions and
procedures of the laws, as well as the enforcement
priorities of the government agencies charged with
enforcing them. These national models include::
1. The Capitalist Model (the US), which seeks to prevent only those
private practices that interfere with the competitive process and
reduce economic welfare;
2. The Social Market Model (Germany), which seeks to limit
political as well as economic power and is more protective of
smaller market players;
3. The European Union Model, which is designed to enhance the
creation of a common market, is more regulatory than the
capitalist model, and also reflects a greater concern for the
welfare of market actors;
4. Industrial Policy with Competition (Japan), which has been
characterized by strong government involvement in organizing
a tight-knit domestic economy and minimal enforcement of
competition law;
5. The Statist Model (China), which involves pervasive government
involvement in the economy with little, if any, competition laws;
6. Restrictive Practices Law (Less Developed Countries), which
principally prohibit abusive or exclusionary conduct by large,
multi-national corporations; and
7. The Free-Market, No-Competition Law Model (Hong Kong and
Singapore), which relies solely on market forces.
Given the different social and legal norms of these
jurisdictions, it is inevitable that the various competition
laws have different underlying goals. At least four different
goals may be identified:
• competition,
• social & political values,
• economic efficiency,
• elimination of barriers to free movement of goods 19
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The goal of favoring competition for its own sake and for
the social benefits competition confers is perhaps best
exemplified in Judge Learned Hand’s 1945 opinion finding
that Alcoa Aluminium Co. violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization. Rejecting
Alcoa’s argument that it did not extract more than fair
profits, the court stated that:
“The Act has wider purposes. Indeed, even though we
disregard all but economic considerations, it would by no
means follow that such concentration of producing power is to
be desired, when it has not been used extortionately. Many
people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power
deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that
immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a
stimulant to industrial progress; that the spur of constant
stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let
well enough alone.”
In 1894, the House of Lords articulated another
justification for competition laws: the public interest. In
Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co (App.
Cas. 535, 565), the House of Lords declared that:
“The public have an interest in every person’s carrying on his
trade freely: so has the individual. All interference with
individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of
trade themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to
public policy, and therefore void.”
Early American courts went even further, with Justice
Peckham declaring in the 1987 case of United States v Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass’n. that the agreements at issue:
“may even temporarily, or perhaps permanently, reduce the
price of the article traded in or manufactured, by reducing the
expense inseparable from the running of many different
companies for the same purpose. Trade or commerce under
those circumstances may nevertheless be badly and unfortunately
restrained by driving out of business the small dealers and
worthy men whose lives have been spend therein, and who
might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered
surroundings. Mere reduction in the price of the commodity
dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class …”
There is evidence in the legislative history of the
Sherman Act that the members of the 1890 Congress were
concerned about the social and political costs of
monopolies and cartels and that they sought to promote
local control of business, prevent the transfer of wealth
from consumers to firms with market power and protect
and “small dealers and worthy men” from too intense
competition from large corporations. These justifications
for competition laws and enforcement have been largely
rejected by modern American courts and commentators,
but they may form the basis for competition laws and
policy adopted by other states.
A February 2003 Report of the American Bar Association,
Section of Antitrust Law, declares that promotion of
economic efficiency should be recognized and effectuated
as the fundamental goal of competition laws. Any additional
goals, according to the Report, should be achieved through
other statutes explicitly drafted to override the
competition policies in particular cases and should be
applied transparently so that it is clear that they do not
further competition policies but other non-economic
goals. Example of such free-standing rules include limitations
on media concentration or protection of domestic industry
for non-economic strategic considerations.
EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAWS
The European Union’s competition laws were designed
to preserve peace by binding together the six original EEC
states in a common market. Since private cartels, as well as
competing national economic and trade policies, could
frustrate that overriding goal, the Treaty of Rome included
competition Articles prohibiting private restrictive
agreements and abuse of dominant market positions.
Although the competition Articles of the Treaty are
substantially similar in language to sections one and two of
the Sherman Act, they have the additional goal of breaking
barriers to trade among Member States, which may
mandate different interpretations of what activity
constitutes a restrictive agreement or abuse of a dominant
position. Thus, Article 81 provides, in part:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market: all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any
other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical
development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
Similarly, Article 82 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market insofar as it
may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling
prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to
the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;20
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(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
In addition to the differences found in the underlying
goals of various national competition laws, there are other
real differences, both substantive and procedural, which
subject multinational firms to potentially conflicting rules
of law. These real divergences arise from, among other factors:
• different substantive standards, in which a particular
activity is prohibited in one jurisdiction and not in
another;
• different remedies, including, for example, the
possibility of criminal prosecution in the United States
but not the European Union for the same activity, the
existence of a private right of action brought by persons
injured by competition violations, and differences in
the measure of civil damages ranging from mandatory
treble damages in the United States to actual damages;
• procedural differences, especially with respect to
deadlines for notification of proposed mergers;
• varying expertise and commitment to enforcement by
the administrative agency charged with enforcing the law;
• finally, enforcement agencies may disagree on the
correct interpretation of the facts of a case or the legal
interpretation of their individual enabling statutes.
Courts and agencies may interpret their statutory
mandate in different fashions, especially if the statutory
language is as broad and vague as sections one and two
of the Sherman Act, which simply prohibit contracts,
combinations and conspiracies “in restraint of trade”
and “monopolization” respectively.
(See the January 2000 ABA Report for a fuller
discussion of these considerations.)
CONSEQUENCES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
ENFORCEMENT
It must be acknowledged that there are potential costs of
divergent competition goals, statutory language, and
duplicitous application. In particular, extraterritorial
criminal enforcement may subject non-citizen individuals
and corporations to high fines and incarceration even if
their native competition law lacks such draconian
penalties. In a recent speech, the Director of Criminal
Enforcement of the US Justice Department Antitrust
Division disclosed that approximately 40 grand juries were
investigating suspected international competition
violations whose subjects were located in more than 25
countries. The priority the United States enforcement
agency gives to criminal prosecution is reflected in the
official’s report that more than $2 billion in fines were
imposed since 1997 and more than 10,000 total days of
incarceration were ordered during the previous year alone.
Significantly, since 1998, more than half of corporate
criminal defendants were foreign-based firms. Extraterriorial
civil and criminal competition enforcement exposes firms
and corporate officers and agents to liability in numerous
jurisdictions. (“A Summary Overview of the Antitrust
Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program”, by Director of
Criminal Enforcement Antitrust Division US Department
of Justice Scott D Hammond, 23 January, 2003). Moreover,
even if government competition agencies cooperate with
each other, private actions, not controlled by the state,
expose firms and individuals to further civil liability. Although
private civil actions do not carry the stigma of criminal
conviction or incarceration, multiple damages mandated by
some competition laws may exceed criminal fines. Finally,
there is the real cost of information and compliance with
competition laws in multiple jurisdictions.
Even though most substantive provisions of competition
laws are largely consistent, there have been examples of
conflicts. These conflicts are most problematic in major
merger cases because the costs of divergence are most
acute; these high profile deals involve large sums of money
and severe pressure to obtain prompt governmental
approval. When there is conflict, with one state’s
competition agency approving a proposed merger and
another challenging it, there may be claims that one or
another agency applied improper standards, such as
nationalist protectionism, to prohibit or approve a
particular merger.
Happily, these conflicts have been few – in the more
than 10 years since adoption of the EU Merger Regulation,
there have been only two serious conflicts between EU and
US competition agencies over potential mergers. In 1996,
Boeing Co and McDonnell Douglas Corp notified the EU
and US competition agencies of their agreement to merge.
The US Federal Trade Commission approved the merger,
over one dissent, within six months of the initial
notification. The European Commission ultimately
approved the merger, contingent on the firms’ agreement
to certain undertakings, after initially recommending that
it be prohibited and considerable public controversy. The
second conflict was the proposed merger of General
Electric and Honeywell, announced in October 2000.
Again, after investigation, the United States Justice
Department, choose not to challenge the proposed $45
billion acquisition, while the EU Commission, after
investigation and negotiation, choose to prohibit the
transaction. The merger agreement was terminated but the
case is pending before the European Court of Justice.
Again, the Commission’s decision was the subject of
strenuous criticism in the American press, including
comments by private and government officials that
threatened to upset the collegial working relationship that
the two agencies had developed over many years. Despite
the costs to private parties and the continuing cooperation
among enforcement officials of disagreement, it must be
stressed that actual conflicts are rare compared to the total
number of proposed mergers reviewed. The EU 21
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Commissioner for Competition Policy, Professor Mario
Monti, has pointed out that, of all the proposed mergers
reviewed by the Commission since the adoption of the
Merger Regulation, only 18, or approximately 1% of all
notifications, have been prohibited and only 6% were
conditioned on additional undertakings by the parties (in a
speech before the IBA on 7 November 2002).
There are other potential substantive divergences
between various national competition laws despite broad
general agreement on the fundamentals of competition law.
In particular, some jurisdictions, including the United
States, treat non-price vertical restraints of trade as largely
pro-competitive or competitively neutral in most cases. By
contrast, the European Union competition law tends to be
more sceptical of the potential pro-competitive effects of
vertical agreements and is more likely to condemn
agreements than comparable United States courts in
comparable cases.
Similarly, with respect to substantive merger and
monopoly standards, the EU competition law prohibits the
“abuse of a dominant position” while the United States
prohibits monopolization and mergers that may tend to
create a monopoly. The difference in statutory language
arguably reflects some divergences in substantive
interpretation, with European authorities, on the whole,
more likely to prohibit a practice based on bundling and
portfolio effects, whilst American merger analysis tends to
consider primarily the direct rather than indirect effects, in
the view of some commentators. To reiterate, however, the
relevant enforcers have stated that they believe that the
areas of divergence are small and, in actual practice, serious
disagreement and conflicting decisions have been few.
For all of the foregoing reasons, one can characterize the
world-wide state of competition law as follows:
First, a large number of jurisdictions, more than 90 at
current count, and including both first-world and
developing nations, have enacted competition laws since
the middle of the twentieth century, with the majority
having been adopted even more recently. This trend is
likely to continue for a variety of reasons, including the
influence of multi-national organizations, which recommend
or mandate such laws to potential member states;
Second, competition laws tend to share many common
features, generally condemning the same hard-core restraints
of trade, however, there are non-trivial differences in
substantive doctrine and procedure among jurisdictions.
Moreover, the underlying jurisprudential basis and goals of
competition laws may vary significantly depending on
jurisdiction, including such diverse justifications as
economic efficiency, furthering social and political goals,
achieving a unified common market, and other goals;
Finally, there are both costs and benefits of the existence
of a multiplicity of competition laws in a world
characterized by increasing global competition. The
potential costs include the cost to firms of information and
compliance with multiple competition regimes, whether or
not the legal requirements are inconsistent. The potential
benefits include the sovereign right of individual states to
effectuate their individual competition-based goals, the
likelihood of different competitive effects of the same
activity in different jurisdictions, and the protection for
consumers found in duplication of resources, e.g. even if
one state fails to proceed against anticompetitive activity,
others are available to enforce their own law and challenge
the harmful activity.
CONCLUSION
I conclude that, on the whole, the benefits of multiple
competition laws and enforcement regimes outweigh the
costs. However, the potential costs are significant and
should be minimized to the greatest extent possible to
facilitate global competition while protecting consumers
and competition from multinational cartels, restrictive
agreements, and monopolies. My final goal for this short
lecture, then, is to articulate a standard to evaluate whether
a particular resolution to inconsistent global enforcement
is recommended. Any such model for minimizing conflicts
must further the values of competition law and
enforcement and reserve sufficient discretion for
individual sovereign states to effectuate their own
legitimate competitive goals and evaluate the effect of
cartels on their own consumers and competitive processes.
I would argue that the characteristics of such a model
system include the following: competition law or laws, and
their enforcement regimes, should be predictable,
transparent, efficient, non-discriminatory in
application, and legitimate or credible. There are
three possible approaches to achieving these goals: pre-
emption of state competition laws in favor of enforcement
of a supra-national standard by a supra-national entity,
formal convergence, eg. adoption and enforcement of a
uniform competition law by individual states, and soft
harmonization or consultation among individual states
with the goal of agreement on important substantive and
procedural standards where conflicts are likely.
The supra-national enforcement agency model fails to
meet the criteria for minimizing costs and maximizing
benefits of individual state competition laws and
enforcement regimes. While such an agency could be
efficient in that it offers a single point of review and
enforcement rather than a multiplicity of law enforcement
actors, it must also guarantee that it would be even-handed
in applying the law and possess international legitimacy.
The current leading model for such an agency is the WTO,
and, although there are 145 WTO member states, that
organization has not achieved a reputation for transparency
necessary to enforce laws that so directly affect individual
consumers and local businesses. Further, the constitutional
courts of individual states are more likely to possess the
legitimacy and credibility to enforce competition laws
extra-territorily than WTO-like dispute settlement bodies.22
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Finally, to eliminate the risk of multiplicitous lawsuits,
any supra-national scheme would have to pre-empt not
only state enforcement but also any private remedies that
exist under state competition law. At this time, a supra-
national competition scheme does not meet the criteria for
maximizing benefits and minimizing costs of multiple
competition laws and enforcement regimes.
A second possible solution is formal convergence or
adoption by sovereign states of a uniform competition
statute. The best example of this model is the European
Union, which requires enactment of a competition law not
inconsistent with Articles 82 and 82 as a condition of
accession. This model achieves uniformity of law and,
possibly, requires the individual states to adopt the
underlying goals of the statute. Mere formal convergence,
however, does not necessarily require all states adopting
the model law to apply it in a non-discriminatory fashion
to domestic and foreign actors. Moreover, formal
convergence also fails the requirements of efficiency and
predictability since the individual states will remain free to
enforce their own, albeit identical, laws, according to their
own discretion.
In my view, the model that provides the most promise is
consultative, potentially leading to soft harmonization of
substance and procedure. The best example of a consultative
process at work is the new International Competition
Network, formed in 2001, a voluntary ”informal network of
antitrust agencies … that will address antitrust enforcement
and policy issues of common interest and formulate
proposals for procedural and substantive convergence
through a results-oriented agenda and structure” (see
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org). Membership is
limited to the national or multi-national competition
agency(ies) responsible for competition enforcement and
currently includes more than 65 jurisdictions.
Significantly, the group does not seek to create a single
multi-national enforcement body or to mandate adoption
of a particular uniform law. To the contrary, its goals are
modest, but more likely to satisfy the requirements for
balancing the benefits and costs of global competition
enforcement. These goals include seeking agreement on
core principles of competition law, specifically those hard
core offenses that are most harmful to competition and
consumers, benchmarking or establishment of guidelines
of best practices for use by individual jurisdictions,
harmonization of procedures that potentially cause the
most difficulties for firms such as timetables for merger
investigations, and adoption of protocols for individual
jurisdictions to share information, documents, and
expertise in individual investigations or more generally.
The network seeks to ensure its legitimacy and
credibility by limiting membership to governmental
agencies and reserving a purely advisory role for private
firms, which are invited to comment but do not have a
policy-making role. The transparency criteria is promoted
by this openness to non-governmental actors, and the goal
would be further advanced if the organization sought to
broaden the set of advisors to include representatives of
consumers as well as firms through various NGO civil
society organizations. The network’s “focus will be on
improving world-wide cooperation and on enhancing
convergence through focussed dialogue.” Thus, by
promoting harmonization of competition law substance,
process, and interpretation, the network is likely to
enhance the predictability of competition enforcement by
its member jurisdictions.
For all of the reasons discussed above, I conclude that
global competition has serious implications for
competition enforcement. The current 90 jurisdictions
that have adopted and are enforcing their own competition
laws offer the benefits of competition for their citizens and
firms doing business in these states. Vigorous competition
is a powerful route to improving the economic and social
condition of citizens by allowing them to participate in a
fair market economy. However, since these numerous
competition laws may have differing underlying goals,
substantive standards, and procedures, there are
inefficiencies and costs to firms seeking to compete in
multiple jurisdictions.
In order to minimize the costs and maximize the
benefits of multiple competition enforcement, reform
should seek predictability, transparency, efficiency,
legitimacy and credibility, and non-discriminatory
enforcement. At this time, a supra-national enforcement
agency that pre-empts state competition laws and
enforcement not is not likely to achieve these goals. Whilst
substantive uniformity on core issues is plausible,
agreement on non-core issues and underlying norms is
unlikely to be achieved. Moreover, differences in
enforcement priorities and expertise make a uniform law
an unappealing option. Voluntary cooperation,
consultation and soft harmonization among state
competition agencies offers the most promise.
Harmonization, especially if the consultative process
includes representatives of diverse interests including
consumers, is efficient, transparent and credible. To the
extent that agreement on core principles and processes is
achieved, enforcement will be more predictable and fair.
Promoting global competition is critically important and
should be of major interest to enforcement agencies
worldwide. While respect for diversity of goals and
methods of achieving the benefits of competition is
important, cooperation among enforcement agencies is
also crucial to minimize the costs for legitimate firms of
compliance with multiple systems. Finally, successful
cooperation is more likely to be found in consultative
process like the ICN and does not require a single global
competition law or sole enforcer.
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